* Statutory
Construction/Interpretation *
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION - The various
methods and tests used by the courts for determining the meaning of a law.
As the Supreme Court has explained: "[I]n interpreting a statute a
court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain,
112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992). Indeed, "[w]hen the words of a statute
are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: `judicial
inquiry is complete.' " Id.
"Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it
includes language in one section but omits it in another." Estate of
Bell v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991).
"The clear import of treaty language controls unless `application of
the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a
result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.'
" Sumitomo Shoji Amer., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180, (1982).
It has been argued both that the meaning of section 9 is not clear and
unambiguous and that to give section 9 its plain meaning would produce a
patently absurd result in that it would frustrate the application of the
principal operative provisions of the Rates Act. Our response is based, in
part, upon Nugget Hydroelectric, where we were faced with a remarkably
similar problem of statutory construction. We were forced to decide
whether the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Policies Act)
preempted the state action doctrine with respect to gas and electric
utilities. Id. One provision of the Policies Act provided that "[n]othing
in this Act or in any amendment made by this Act affects . . . the
applicability of the antitrust laws to any electric utility or gas
utility." Id., quoting 16 U.S.C. S 2603(1). Nugget argued that the
term "antitrust laws" referred only to statutory law and not to
the common law state action doctrine. It also argued that the statute was
ambiguous and that the legislative history revealed that Congress clearly
intended the Policies Act to preempt the state action doctrine. Id. We
held that the language of the statute was clear, that it precluded us from
holding that Policies Act preempted the state action doctrine, and that it
did not produce an absurd result. See id. Therefore, we refused to look
any further than the face of the statute.
Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of
specific provisions ignores the complexity of the legislative problems
Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics of legislative action.
Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social or
economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply on the
means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation
may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain
purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute
itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in the end,
prevents the effectuation of congressional intent. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
373-74 (1986).
The Supreme Court has set forth the general rule that "[w]here a
particular Amendment `provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government
behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
"substantive due process," must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.'" Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality)
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
The canon of construction, invoked frequently in cases in which the issue
is whether to imply a private right of action, that courts must "presum[e]
that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute . . . when Congress
has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated
system of procedures for enforcement." E.g., Northwest Airlines, 451
U.S. at 97; see also Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Federal Employees,
489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) ("It is an `elemental canon' of statutory
interpretation that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts
must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). In such cases,
`[i]n the absence of strong indicia of contrary congressional intent, we
are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it
considered appropriate.'" (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981))). In the cases in
which the canon traditionally has been applied, the question has been
whether the statute at issue permits an implied private right of action.
The canon serves to ensure that courts do not upset a "comprehensive
legislative scheme" by creating additional "procedures for
enforcement" that Congress did not intend. Northwest Airlines, 451
U.S. at 97.
"When Congress includes a specific term in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it should not be implied
where it is excluded." Arizona Elec. Power Co-op. v. United States,
816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987); see also West Coast Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Arcata Community Recycling Ctr., 846 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
Every question of statutory interpretation starts with the language of the
statute. "The primary indication of [Congress'] intent is the
language of the statute." United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475,
1480 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 115
S.Ct. 2357 (1995). Two well-established canons of statutory
interpretation:. First, courts must ascertain the intent of the
Legislature to effectuate the purpose of the law (DuBois v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387); Second, they must adopt an
interpretation that avoids an absurd result the Legislature did not
intend. (Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 673.) When Congress
enumerates an exception or exceptions to a rule, we can infer that no
other exceptions apply. Koniag v. Koncor Forest Resource, 39 F.3d 991, 998
(9th Cir. 1994); Horner v. Adnrzjewski, 811 F.2d 571, 574-75 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 912 (1987); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction S 47.23 (5th Ed. 1992). When Congress
includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill, but deletes it
prior to enactment, we presume that the limitation was not intended.
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983). When Congress does
not direct whether a rule should be uniform, the courts determine if a
uniform federal rule is appropriate based on the three-part test set out
in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). "Under
that test, a court must determine . . . (1) whether the issue requires `a
nationally uniform body of law,'; (2) `whether application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program'; and (3)
whether `application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial
relationships predicated on state law.'" Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458
(quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29). Prohibition against
construing statutes so as to render any of their provisions superfluous.
See Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991).
Courts begin "with the fundamental premise that the objective of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative
intent." (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) To discover
that intent we first look first to the words of the statute, giving them
their usual and ordinary meaning. (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9
Cal.4th 738, 744; DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601.)
"Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter
them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the
statute or from its legislative history." (Burden v. Snowden, supra,
2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION -LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative intent is what a legislature as a whole had in mind when it
passed a particular statute. Normally, any given statute is interpreted by
looking just at the statute's language. But when the language is ambiguous
or unclear, courts try to glean the legislative intent behind words by
looking at legislative interpretations (for instance, reports issued by
legislative committees) which were relied upon by legislators when voting
on the statute. Statutes are often ambiguous enough to support more than
one interpretation, and the material reflecting legislative intent is
frequently sparse. This leaves courts free to interpret statutes according
to their own predilections. Once a court interprets the legislative
intent, however, other courts will usually not go through the exercise
again, but rather will enforce the statute as interpreted by the other
court. practice. It is defined to be "the drawing in inference by the
act of reason, as to the intent of an instrument, from given
circumstances, upon principles deduced from men's general motives, conduct
and action." This definition may, perbaps, not be sufficiently
complete, inasmuch as the term instrument generally implies something
reduced into writing, whereas construction, is equally necessary to
ascertain the meaning of engagements merely verbal. In other respects it
appears to be perfectly accurate. The Treatise of Equity, defines
interpretation to be the collection of the meaning out of signs the most
probable. There are two kinds of constructions; the first, is literal or
strict; this is uniformly the construction given to penal statutes. The
other is liberal, and applied, usually, to remedial laws, in order to
enforce them according to their spirit. In the Supreme Court of the United
States, the rule which has been uniformly observed in construing statutes,
is to adopt the construction made by the courts of the country by whose
legislature the statute was enacted. This rule may be susceptible of some
modification when applied to British statutes which are adopted in any of
these states. By adopting them, they become our own, as entirely as if
they had been enacted by the legislature of the state.
The received construction, in England, at the time they are admitted to
operate in this couutry - indeed, to the time of our separation from the
British empire - may very properly be considered as accompanying the
statutes themselves, and forming an integral part of them. But, however we
may respect the subsequent decisions (and certainly they are entitled to
great respect,) we do not admit their absolute authority. If the English
courts vary their construction of a statute, which is common to the two
countries, we do not hold ourselves bound to fluctuate with them.
The great object which the law has in all cases, in contemplation, as
furnishing the leading principle of the rules to be observed in the
construction of contracts, is, that justice is to be done between the
parties, by enforcing the performance of their agreement, according to the
sense in which it was mutually understood and relied upon at the time of
making it.
When the contract is in writing, the difficulty lies only in the
construction of the words; when it is to be made out by parol testimony,
that difficulty is augmented by the possible mistakes of the witnesses as
to the words used by the parties; but still, when the evidence is
received, it must be assumed as correct, when a construction is to be put
upon it.
The following are the principal rules to be observed in the construction
of contracts. When. the words used are of precise and unambiguous meaning,
leading to no absurdity, that meaning is to be taken as conveying the
intention of the parties. But should there be manifest absurdity in the
application of such meaning, to the particular occasion, this will let in
construction to discover the true intention of the parties: for example;
- 1. When words are manifestly inconsistent with the declared purpose and
object of the contract, they will be rejected; as if, in a contract of
sale, the price of the thing sold should be acknowledged as received,
while the obligation of the seller was not to deliver the commodity. When
words are omitted so as to defeat the effect of the contract, they will be
supplied by the obvious sense and inference from the context; as, if the
contract stated that the seller, for the consideration of one hundred
dollars, sold a horse, and the buyer promised to pay him for the said
horse one hundred, the word dollars would be supplied. When the words,
taken in one sense, go to defeat the contract, while they are susceptible
of another construction which will give effect to the design of the
parties, and not destroy it, the latter will be preferred.
- 2. The plain, ordinary, and popular sense of the words, is to be
preferred to the more unusual, etymological, and recondite meaning or even
to the literal, and strictly grammatical construction of the words, where
these last would lead to any inefficacy or inconsistency.
- 3. When a peculiar meaning has been stamped upon the words by the usage
of a particular trade or place in which the contract occurs, such
technical or peculiar meaning will prevail. It is as if the parties in
framing their contract had made use of a foreign language, which the court
is not bound to understand, but which on evidence of its import, must be
applied. But the expression so made technical and appropriate, and the
usage by which it has become so, must be so clear that the court cannot
entertain a doubt upon the subject. Technical words are to be taken
according to their approved and known use in the trade in which the
contract is entered into, or to wbich it relates, unless they have
manifestly been understood in another sense by the parties.
- 4. The place where a contract has been made, is a most material
consideration in its construction. Generally its validity is to be decided
by the law of the place where it is made; if valid there, it is considered
valid every where. Its construction is to be according to the laws of the
place where it is made for example, where a note was given in China,
payable eighteen months after date, without any stipulation as to the
amount of interest, the court allowed the Chinese interest of one per
centum per month from the expiration of the eighteen mouths.
- 5. Previous conversations, and all that passes in the course of
correspondence or negotiation leading to the contract, are entirely
superseded by the written agreement. The parties having agreed to reduce
the terms of their contract to writing, the document is constituted as the
only true and final exposition of their admissions and intentions; and
nothing which does not appear in the written agreement will be considered
as a part of the contract. But this rule admits of some exceptions; as,
where a declaration is made before a deed is executed, showing the design
with which it was to be executed, in cases of frauds and trusts, though no
trust was declared in the writing.
- 6. All contracts made in general terms, in the ordinary course of trade,
are presumed to incorporate the usage and custom of the trade to which
they relate. The parties are presumed to know such usages, and not to
intend to exclude them. But when there is a special stipulation in
opposition to, or inconsistent with the custom, that will of course
prevail.
- 7 . When there is an ambiguity which impedes the execution of the
contract, it is first, if possible, to be resolved, on a view of the whole
contract or instrument, aided by the admitted views of the parties, and,
if indispensable, parol evidence may be admitted to clear it, consistently
with the words.
- 8. When the words cannot be reconciled with any practicable or
consistent interpretation, they are to be considered as not made use of
"perinde sunt ac si scripts non essent."
It is the duty of the court to give a construction to all written
instruments.
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